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INTRODUCTION
Outsourcing. Downsizing. Eliminating redundancy. The mass
layoff is a phenomenon susceptible to endless labeling and relabel-
ing, be it by epithet or euphemism, but under any name it represents
a massive trauma for workers. Legislators are by no means insensi-
tive to the economic-and political-dimensions of this trauma. In
1988, back when the bogeyman was not China but Japan, Congress
tackled the issue with the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Noti-
fication Act' (WARN Act), which requires firms above a certain size
to provide notice before either a plant closing or a mass layoff.' To
encourage compliance, the Act allows for civil actions against em-
ployers who fail to give notice, with liability of up to sixty days'
backpay and lost benefits
Unfortunately, when Congress passed the WARN Act, it ne-
glected to specify the appropriate finder of fact for these lawsuits. In
the absence of any express direction, the federal courts have been
forced to grapple with whether a plaintiff bringing a civil action un-
der the WARN Act has a Seventh Amendment right to demand a
trial by jury.' A convincing answer has yet to rise from the scrum-at
present litigants are faced with a division of authority. This Com-
ment seeks to resolve that division by using existing interpretations
of the Act's remedies to inform the Seventh Amendment analysis.
On the basis of this analysis, the Comment concludes that WARN
Act plaintiffs have a constitutional right to a jury trial.
Part I describes two seemingly unrelated areas of law: the Su-
preme Court's prevailing analysis of the Seventh Amendment and its
t BA 2008, The University of Chicago; JD Candidate 2013, The University of Chicago
Law School.
1 Pub L No 100-379, 102 Stat 890 (1988), codified at 29 USC § 2101 et seq.
2 29 USC §§ 2101-02. Sixty days' notice is required when: (1) an employer with 100 or
more employees closes a plant, (2) an employer conducts a mass layoff of 500 or more employ-
ees, or (3) an employer with at least 150 employees lays off more than one-third of its work-
force. 29 USC § 2102.
3 29 USC § 2104.
4 See US Const Amend VII.
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interpretation of federal statutes that lack explicit statutes of limita-
tions. Part II then explores how the Court's Seventh Amendment
analysis has been applied to the WARN Act. Part III demonstrates
how precedent arising in the statute of limitations context has re-
peatedly been used by the Supreme Court to resolve Seventh
Amendment questions. Building on this observation, it then surveys
the relevant case law spawned by the absence of an explicit statute of
limitations in the WARN Act. This precedent is found to militate
strongly for the preservation of a right to jury trial in actions under
the Act. Finally, the conclusion briefly reflects on the broader ap-
plicability of a framework under which extrinsic case law is integrat-
ed into the prevailing Seventh Amendment analysis.
I. THE PREVAILING ANALYSIS OF THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
The Seventh Amendment provides that "[i]n Suits at common
law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved."' In interpreting this lan-
guage, the Supreme Court has developed a historical test that at-
tempts to situate claims in the context of the English common law
system as it existed at the time of the Seventh Amendment's adop-
tion.6 This analysis focuses on whether a justiciable issue would have
been heard by an English court of common law, as opposed to a
court of equity or court of admiralty.' The historical inquiry thus de-
manded has proven daunting to the federal courts, particularly for
novel causes of action created by Congress. Though the applicability
of the Seventh Amendment to such statutory causes of action is ac-
cepted "as a matter too obvious to be doubted,"' the actual applica-
tion has often devolved into "abstruse historical inquiry.'
9
5 US Const Amend VII.
6 See, for example, Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc v Redman, 295 US 654, 657 (1935)
("The right of trial by jury thus preserved is the right which existed under the English common
law when the amendment was adopted."); Dimick v Schiedt, 293 US 474, 476 (1935) (holding
that interpretation of the "scope and meaning of the Seventh Amendment" necessitates resort
to "the appropriate rules of the common law established at the time of the adoption of that
constitutional provision in 1791"). See also Margaret L. Moses, What the Jury Must Hear: The
Supreme Court's Evolving Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence, 68 Geo Wash L Rev 183, 187-92
& n 24 (2000) (dating the birth of the historical test to the Redman and Dimick decisions and
arguing that it arose by practical necessity following the merger of the courts of law and courts
of equity at the state and federal levels).
7 See Parsons v Bedford, Breedlove, and Robeson, 28 US 433, 446 (1830) (holding that
the phrase "common law" in the Seventh Amendment "is used in contradistinction to equity,
and admiralty, and maritime jurisprudence").
8 Rogers v Loether, 467 F2d 1110, 1114 (7th Cir 1972) (collecting cases). See also Curtis
v Loether, 415 US 189, 194 (1974) ("The Seventh Amendment does apply to actions enforcing
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While the Supreme Court has elaborated upon the historical test
several times in the past half century, its prevailing expression is
found in Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local No. 391 v Terry,"
where the Court assessed whether respondents suing for backpay
under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947"
(LMRA) were entitled to a jury trial. In addressing this issue, Justice
Thurgood Marshall outlined a two-part inquiry. First, a court must
"compare the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the
courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equi-
ty."'2 Next, a court must "examine the remedy sought and determine
whether it is legal or equitable in nature." 3 The second prong of this
inquiry is the more important."
The Chauffeurs Court's application of this test provides a useful
example of the typical Seventh Amendment analysis. Considering
the first prong, a plurality of the Chauffeurs Court weighed a range
of possible eighteenth-century analogues to the LMRA action under
scrutiny. The petitioner-union presented two equitable analogies-
an action by a trust beneficiary against a trustee for breach of fiduci-
ary duty and an action to set aside an arbitration award. The re-
spondents, meanwhile, analogized the LMRA action to an attorney
malpractice action." Ultimately, the plurality concluded that the
statutory action encompassed both legal and equitable issues and
hence determined that the first prong left the Court in "equipoise as
to whether respondents [were] entitled to a jury trial."'" Two justices
penned separate concurrences to expressly reject the pursuit of an
extended historical analysis.'7
Turning to the second prong, the Chauffeurs Court began by
noting that money damages were traditionally the remedy available
in courts of law.'" Thus, while an award of monetary relief need not
statutory rights, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates legal rights and
remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law.").
9 Ross v Bernhard, 396 US 531, 538 n 10 (1970).
10 494 US 558 (1990).
11 Pub L No 80-101, ch 120, 61 Stat 136, 156-57, codified at 29 USC § 185.
12 Chauffeurs, 494 US at 565 (Marshall) (plurality), quoting Tull v United States, 481 US
412, 417 (1987).
13 Chauffeurs, 494 US at 565 (Marshall) (plurality), quoting Tull, 481 US at 417-18.
14 Granfinanciera, SA v Nordberg, 492 US 33, 42 (1989).
15 Chauffeurs, 494 US at 566-69 (Marshall) (plurality).
16 id at 569-70.
17 See id at 575 (Brennan concurring) (opining that the first prong should be disregarded
since it "needlessly convolutes [the Court's] Seventh Amendment jurisprudence"); id at 581
(Stevens concurring) (arguing that the plurality "exaggerat[ed] the importance of finding a
precise common-law analogue").
18 Id at 570 (majority), citing Curtis, 415 US at 196.
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necessarily be construed as legal, the "general rule" is that money
damages are legal in nature. " The Court then addressed two possible
exceptions to this general rule: Damages that are restitutionary and
damages that are "incidental to or intertwined with injunctive re-
lief." ' Neither of these exceptions was found to be applicable, and
the Court ultimately concluded that the remedy of backpay in the
LMRA context is legal in nature." Because of this second-prong
analysis, the respondents were held to be entitled to a jury trial in
their LMRA action."
II. WARN ACT SEVENTH AMENDMENT ANALYSES
This Part documents how the lower courts have applied the
Chauffeurs framework to actions brought under the WARN Act. It
begins by laying out the remedies provided under the Act. It then
examines how divergent characterizations of those remedies have
engendered a division of legal authority.
A. Remedies under the Act: Backpay, Lost Benefits, and
Attorney's Fees
Remedies under the WARN Act are not expansive. Aggrieved
workers can receive, at most, sixty days' backpay, lost benefits, and
attorney's fees, with even that liability open to diminution by other
forms of compensation or at the court's discretion. Moreover, these
remedies are designated as "the exclusive remedies" for any viola-
tion of the WARN Act, with federal courts explicitly stripped of the
"authority to enjoin a plant closing or mass layoff."'3 The prospects
of a local government unit bringing a civil action are similarly mea-
ger- at most, a defendant can be forced to forfeit $30,000 plus attor-
ney's fees. Thus, the provisions of the WARN Act do not saddle of-
fending employers with outsized penalties.
The relevant language in 29 USC § 2104 lays bare the limited
remedies available under the Act, providing that a nondisclosing
employer "shall be liable to each aggrieved employee who suffers an
employment loss" for
19 Chauffeurs, 494 US at 570.
20 Id at 570-72, quoting Tull, 481 US at 424.
21 Chauffeurs, 494 US at 573.
22 Id.
23 29 USC § 2104(b).
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(A) back pay for each day of violation...
(B) benefits under an employee benefit plan described in sec-
tion 1002(3) of this title, including the cost of medical expenses
incurred during the employment loss which would have been
covered under an employment benefit plan if the employment
loss had not occurred.24
Where an employer fails to notify a local government unit as re-
quired under the Act,5 such employer "shall be subject to a civil
penalty of not more than $500 for each day of such violation.'"6 In
any case, liability is capped at a maximum of 60 days, or one-half the
employment tenure for employees who have worked less than 120
days." Supplementing this primary liability, "the court, in its discre-
tion, may allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee as
part of the costs.' '"
Further diminishing the efficacy of these remedial provisions,
the Act grants employers wide latitude to diminish or eliminate
damages. Liability to aggrieved workers can be reduced if the em-
ployer otherwise compensates the employee through, for example,
wages or voluntary payments." Moreover, any civil penalties can be
avoided so long as "the employer pays to each aggrieved employee
the amount for which the employer is liable.., within 3 weeks from
the date the employer orders the shutdown or layoff."3" Even if the
employer does not otherwise compensate aggrieved employees, the
Act grants the court broad discretion to reduce or eliminate liability
where an employer has demonstrated good faith."
24 29 USC § 2104(a)(1)(A)-(B). The employment benefit plans referenced in this statu-
tory language include the broad array of health and pension benefit plans regulated by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub L No 93-406, 88 Stat 829,
codified as amended at 29 USC § 1001 et seq.
25 The WARN Act requires that employers serve a written notice "to the State or entity
designated by the State to carry out rapid response activities ... and the chief elected official of
the unit of local government." 29 USC § 2102(a)(2).
26 29 USC § 2104(a)(3).
27 29 USC § 2104(a)(1).
28 29 USC § 2104(a)(6).
29 29 USC § 2104(a)(2).
30 29 USC § 2104(a)(3).
31 This good faith consideration is described as follows,
If an employer which has violated this chapter proves to the satisfaction of the court
that the act or omission that violated this chapter was in good faith and that the em-
ployer had reasonable grounds for believing that the act or omission was not a viola-
tion of this chapter the court may, in its discretion, reduce the amount of the liability
or penalty provided for in this section.
29 USC § 2104(a)(4).
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B. WARN Act Jury Trial Decisions
At present, only a handful of courts have considered Seventh
Amendment rights in the WARN Act context. Two decisions in par-
ticular-Bentley v Arlee Home Fashions, Inc"2 and Bledsoe v Emery
Worldwide Airlines, Inc"-represent the lion's share of direct prece-
dent. In Bentley, a 1994 decision by the Eastern District of Arkansas,
the court held that a right to trial by jury exists for actions brought
under the WARN Act. Bledsoe, a 2011 decision out of the Sixth Cir-
cuit, arrived at the opposite conclusion. Though each decision fo-
cused almost entirely on an application of the Chauffeurs test, the
two courts differed sharply on the proper characterization of the
WARN Act actions and its remedies.
1. Decisions finding a jury trial right in WARN Act actions.
a) Bentley. Taking up the Chauffeurs test, the Bentley court
favorably compared actions under the WARN Act to three actions
at law: breach of contract, personal injury, and wrongful termina-
tion.4 With respect to the breach of contract analogy, the court noted
that the Chauffeurs majority had taken a similar tack in its Seventh
Amendment analysis." In order to harmonize the disparities between
the WARN Act and the cause of action in Chauffeurs-a suit under
the LMRA for the breach of a collective bargaining agreement-the
court noted that collective bargaining agreements are often a vehicle
for mandating disclosures of plant closings or mass layoffs. 6
In deciding that an action brought by an aggrieved employee
under the WARN Act is similar to a personal injury claim, the court
once again followed a path broken by the Supreme Court. In particu-
lar, the district court sought guidance from Wooddell v International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 71," where a similar analo-
gy was adopted to vindicate the Seventh Amendment rights of a un-
ion member who sued his local union under the Labor-Management
32 861 F Supp 65 (ED Ark 1994).
33 635 F3d 836 (6th Cir 2011), cert denied, 132 S Ct 114 (2011).
34 Bentley, 861 F Supp at 67. The court was somewhat vague on whether the personal
injury and wrongful termination analogies are distinct. Though it phrased them separately at
the outset of its analysis, it later provided support for what it referred to as an analogy to a
"personal injury wrongful termination claim." Id at 68.
35 Id at 67-68, quoting Chauffeurs. 494 US at 570. The Chauffeurs Court failed to present
any explicit argument for the breach of contract analogy. Rather, the Court proceeded by elim-
inating alternative analogies, then anointed breach of contract as a victor by attrition. Chauf-
feurs, 494 US at 566-70 (Marshall) (plurality).
36 Bentley, 861 F Supp at 67-68.
37 502 US 93 (1991).
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Reporting and Disclosure Act of 195938 (LMRDA) for lost wages."
Hampering this analysis was the conclusory nature of the decision in
Wooddell, which made no effort to explicitly substantiate its embrace
of the personal injury analogy.
Addressing the second prong of the Chauffeurs test, the Bentley
court contrasted legal and equitable remedies by reference to the
aims they are designed to advance. The court asserted that whereas
legal awards seek to provide compensation for a plaintiff's loss, equi-
table awards provide restitution to deprive the defendant of his un-
just gain."2 Having provided this definitional distinction, the court
suggested that the WARN Act remedies fall firmly on the legal side
of the divide, insofar as they seek not to claw back an undeserved
benefit from an employer but rather to compensate employees for
damages caused by the employer's failure to provide requisite no-
tice." To buttress this characterization, the court noted that the Act
explicitly forbids a federal court from enjoining a plant closing or a
mass layoff-a prototypical equitable remedy." Next, the court con-
fronted the equitable characterization of a similar backpay remedy
provided in Title VIP3 actions for discriminatory employment prac-
tices, concluding that the differing aims of Title VII and the WARN
Act sufficed to distinguish this apparently contrary precedent.
In tandem with its Chauffeurs analysis, the Bentley court also
noted that, during the congressional debate, an opponent of the Act
insisted that it grants a right to jury trial.' Senator Orrin Hatch,
speaking in opposition to the Act, warned that "jury trials would be
available in any suit for damages claiming employer violation of [the
38 Pub L No 86-257, 73 Stat 519, codified as amended at 29 USC § 401 et seq.
39 Bentley, 861 F Supp at 68, citing Wooddell, 502 US at 112. See also Reed v United
Transportation Union, 488 US 319, 326-27 (1989) (holding that an action under the LMRDA
for violation of a union member's right to free speech should borrow the statute of limitations
from state personal injury actions and reasoning from an analogy between the actions).
40 Bentley, 861 F Supp at 68, citing Dan B. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies
136-37 (West 1973).
41 Bentley, 861 F Supp at 68. See also United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v
Dietrich Industries, Inc, 1994 WL 661193, *1 (ND Ala) ("The statute does not talk in terms of
'lost pay' but uses an employee's rate of pay as a measure of damages or civil penalty, applying
the rate to each day of violation regardless of whether the employee would have worked but
for the closure or layoff.").
42 Bentley, 861 F Supp at 68. The court neglected to explain the significance of this statu-
tory provision. Id. However, the implication is that Congress, by denying the federal courts
authority to grant specific equitable relief, intended that the Act provide legal relief.
43 Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701-16, Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 241, 253-66, codified as
amended at 42 USC § 2000e et seq.
44 Bentley, 861 F Supp at 66 ("The Plaintiffs cite the statements of Senator Orrin Hatch, a
rigorous opponent of the WARN Act, in support of its argument that the right to a jury trial
was an assumed right of the WARN Act.").
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WARN Act]," ' referencing the 1978 Supreme Court decision in Lo-
rillard v Pons"6 for support.' The Bentley court recognized that the
Supreme Court has questioned the value of remarks from opponents
of legislation4" but noted that such remarks are relevant where pro-
ponents fail to respond.49 Combining its Chauffeurs analysis and this
reasoning from legislative history, the court concluded that the relief
granted under the WARN Act is legal in nature. Consequently, the
court held that the Act supports a Seventh Amendment right to trial
by jury.
b) Dietrich Industries. While the Bentley decision has not
exerted much influence on other federal courts, a second district
court simultaneously reached an equivalent holding. In United Steel-
workers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v Dietrich Industries, Inc,"' the
Northern District of Alabama denied a defendant's motion to strike
a demand for a jury trial in a WARN Act suit.' The unreported opin-
ion-issued one month before Bentley was decided-justified this
disposition by following Eleventh Circuit precedent that the WARN
Act does not award a "'make whole' remedy in the form of back
pay," but rather provides for compensation using the employee's
rate of pay "as a measure of damages or civil penalty."" Insofar as
this precedent directly countermanded the only argument raised by
the defendant-employer, the court held that the plaintiffs correctly
characterized the WARN Act as providing a legal remedy. Thus, in
an analysis sharply restricted to the arguments presented by the par-
ties before it, the court found that actions under the Act must receive
Seventh Amendment protection.
45 134 Cong Rec 15760. 15763 (June 23, 1988) (statement of Sen Orrin Hatch) ("[A]II of
this [WARN Act litigation] can be thrown to a jury.").
46 434 US 575 (1978).
47 134 Cong Rec at 15763 (cited in note 45) (statement of Sen Hatch) ("Supreme Court
cases, such as the 1978 decision in Lorillard versus Pons, demonstrate clearly that jury trials
would be available in any suit for damages claiming employer violations of this law."). See also
Lorillard, 434 US at 577, 580-82 (finding a congressional intent to provide for jury trials in suits
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, insofar as that Act was modeled on
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, suits under which had long been established to support a
right to trial by jury).
48 Bentley, 861 F Supp at 67, quoting NLRB v Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehouse-
men, Local 760, 377 US 58, 66 (1964).
49 Bentley, 861 F Supp at 67, citing Arizona v California, 373 US 546, 582-83 (1963).
50 1994 WL 661193 (ND Ala).
51 Id at *1.
52 Id, citing United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v North Star Steel Co, 5
F3d 39, 43 (3d Cir 1993) (rejecting the argument that the use of the phrase "back pay" implies
a "lost earnings concept").
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c) Similar decisions in other courts. Several other courts have
permitted jury trials in WARN Act suits without expressly adopting
a stance on the issue. In Sheinberg v Sorenson,53 for example, the Dis-
trict of New Jersey noted the division of authority over the jury ques-
tion but declined to reach a decision. 4 Instead, the court reasoned
that since the plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial on independent
state law claims within the same complaint, a motion to strike jury
demand should be denied in order to conserve judicial resources."
Finally, two circuit courts of appeals have affirmed jury verdicts in
WARN Act actions without addressing whether it was appropriate
for a jury to be appointed as fact finder."6
2. Decisions denying a jury trial right in WARN Act actions.
After a decade-long lull following the decision in Bentley, the
WARN Act jury question has seen a recent resurgence. Notably, the
decisions in the last several years have come out unanimously in op-
position to a right to a jury trial under the Act. While this unanimity
might herald the emergence of a new consensus, at the moment it
merely represents a sharp division of authority. Presently, the Sixth
Circuit's opinion in Bledsoe is the chief counterpoint to Bentley.
a) Bledsoe. While the Sixth Circuit in Bledsoe did not itself
pursue a detailed analysis of the first step of the Chauffeurs test, the
district court opinion that it broadly affirmed provides an extended
rebuttal of the Bentley court's treatment of the issue. Considering
first the analogy to a breach of contract action, the Bledsoe district
court noted the difficulty of discerning any agreement between em-
ployers and employees in the context of the WARN Act.7 In the ab-
sence of any such agreement, the analogy to a breach of contract
claim was brusquely discarded. Moving on to the analogy to a legal
action for personal injury arising out of a wrongful discharge, the
court sought to distinguish the Supreme Court's characterization of
53 2006 WL 2460649 (D NJ).
54 Id at *4-5.
55 Id at *5. However, the court retained discretionary authority to adjust any jury award
under the WARN Act. Id.
56 See generally Local Union No. 1992 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers v The Okonite Co, 358 F3d 278 (3d Cir 2004) (upholding the jury verdict for the plain-
tiff union who brought a WARN Act action alleging that the defendant-employer failed to give
employees sufficient advance notice of a plant closing); Hollowell v Orleans Regional Hospital
LLC. 217 F3d 379 (5th Cir 2000) (upholding the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, who as-
serted claims under the WARN Act arising from closure of the hospital).
57 Bledsoe v Emery Worldwide Airlines, 258 F Supp 2d 780, 792 (SD Ohio 2003) (explain-
ing that the plaintiffs did not have an agreement of their own with the defendant-employer re-
quiring it to provide them with sixty days' notice of a mass layoff or plant closing).
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LMRDA damages as a legal remedy by highlighting the differences
between the labor laws. Unlike the WARN Act, the court observed,
the LMRDA seeks to compensate an employee for discrimination
suffered, not backpay. Moreover, the LMRDA provides a broad
range of remedies, as contrasted with the limited remedies provided
under the WARN Act.6
Ultimately, the Bledsoe district court concluded that WARN
Act actions are more plausibly analogized to equitable actions for
breach of fiduciary duty.6 Fleshing out this analogy, the court cast
the employer as a trustee that owes a fiduciary duty to safeguard the
welfare of its employees by giving sixty days' notice of impending
plant closures or mass layoffs. Under this characterization of the Act,
an employer who flouts the provisions of the Act and fails to notify
its employees of their impending termination is effectively withhold-
ing or mismanaging the pay and benefits that would otherwise be
disbursed. Thus, the remedy of backpay and benefits would be anal-
ogous to the restitution of funds wrongly managed or withheld." This
analogy was explicitly affirmed on appeal."
In addressing the second step of the Chauffeurs test, the Sixth
Circuit broadly characterized the remedies of the Act as restitution-
ary in nature, insofar as they are "tailored to restoring the pay and
benefits that the employer should have provided." 2 To support this
reasoning, the court emphasized that the Act places the entire dam-
ages award within the district court's discretion. The court noted that
then-Justice William Rehnquist had been influenced by a similar
grant of discretion in his concurrence in Albemarle Paper Co v
Moody, 3 where the majority held that backpay in Title VII cases is
restitutionary in nature.' Justice Rehnquist wrote separately to em-
phasize that where an award of backpay is analogized to an award of
damages, "such an award upon proper proof would follow virtually
as a matter of course from a finding that [the elements of the action
had been satisfied]."'" He concluded that to "the extent [] that the
58 Id at 793.
59 Id, citing Chauffeurs, 494 US at 567 (Marshall) (plurality) (noting that such actions for
breach of fiduciary duty were historically "within the exclusive jurisdiction of courts of equity").
60 Bledsoe, 258 F Supp 2d at 793.
61 Bledsoe, 635 F3d at 842.
62 Id at 843.
63 422 US 405 (1975).
64 Bledsoe, 635 F3d at 844 (discussing Justice Rehnquist's distinction between mandatory
and discretionary remedies), citing Albemarle Paper, 422 US at 443 (Rehnquist concurring);
Albemarle Paper, 422 US at 419-23.
65 Albemarle Paper, 422 US at 442 (Rehnquist concurring), citing Curtis v Loether, 415
US 189. 197 (1974).
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District Court retains substantial discretion as to whether or not to
award backpay notwithstanding a finding of unlawful discrimination,
the nature of the jurisdiction which the court exercises is equitable,
and under our cases neither party may demand a jury trial."'
Within the confines of its second-prong discussion, the Sixth
Circuit also cited an unreported decision by a bankruptcy court in
Cain v Inacorn Corp,"7 a case that indirectly implicated the Seventh
Amendment question. In Cain, plaintiffs bringing a WARN Act suit
against a bankrupt defendant sought to avoid the automatic stay of
bankruptcy," which protects the claim resolution process by exclud-
ing adversary proceedings that are conventional actions at law." Re-
lying heavily on the Albemarle Paper concurrence, the Cain court
held that WARN Act suits seek equitable relief*
7
In response to an argument raised by the Bledsoe plaintiffs, the
Sixth Circuit also devoted some attention to distinguishing its earlier
analysis of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 199371 (FMLA) in
Frizzell v Southwest Motor Freight.71 In Frizzell, the Sixth Circuit
concluded that the FMLA provides a right to a jury trial in suits for
damages.7 The Bledsoe court characterized that earlier decision as
hinging on the FMLA's separate provision for "damages" and "such
equitable relief as may be appropriate," a structural feature absent
from the WARN Act.' Moreover, the Frizzell court relied upon the
fact that the FMLA was explicitly modeled on the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act of 1938" (FLSA), a statute that has been interpreted to pro-
vide a right to jury trial." Both of these factors-separate remedy
provisions and emulation of the FLSA-were cited by the Supreme
Court in Lorillard as grounds for holding that Congress had intended
to preserve the right to jury trials in claims brought under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967" (ADEA).8 Neither of
these factors are present in the WARN Act.
66 Albemarle Paper, 422 US at 443 (Rehnquist concurring).
67 2001 WL 1819997 (Bankr D Del).
68 See id at *1, citing Loehrer v McDonnell Douglas Corp, 1992 US Dist LEXIS 22555
(ED Mo).
69 For the automatic stay provision of bankruptcy law, see 11 USC § 362.
70 See Cain, 2001 WL 1819997 at *1 (holding that a WARN Act suit for backpay sought
equitable relief).
71 Pub L No 103-3, 107 Stat 6, codified at 29 USC § 2601 et seq.
72 154 F3d 641 (6th Cir 1998).
73 Id at 642-44.
74 Bledsoe, 635 F3d at 844-45, quoting 29 USC § 2617(a)(1)(A)-(B).
75 Pub L No 75-718, ch 676, 52 Stat 1060, codified as amended at 29 USC § 201 et seq.
76 Bledsoe, 635 F3d at 845.
77 Pub L No 90-202, 81 Stat 602, codified as amended at 29 USC §§ 621-34.
78 See Lorillard, 434 US at 580-83.
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Lastly, the Sixth Circuit briefly addressed, in a footnote, the sig-
nificance of cases in which courts have decided to apply borrowed
state-law statutes of limitations to WARN Act actions. " In interpret-
ing federal laws where Congress has failed to supply an express limi-
tations period, the Supreme Court has "generally concluded that
Congress intended that the courts apply the most closely analogous
statute of limitations under state law.""1 While the Supreme Court di-
rectly approved such borrowing for the WARN Act in North Star
Steel Co v Thomas,' the Sixth Circuit in Bledsoe concluded that the
Court provided no guidance on the proper state-statute analogue in
that case-and hence that the decision in North Star had no bearing
on the Seventh Amendment question.'
For its part, the Bledsoe district court also exerted great effort to
situate the WARN Act within the universe of Supreme Court Sev-
enth Amendment labor law decisions. Central to this discussion was
an examination of Lorillard and Frizzell that would later be reca-
pitulated on appeal." However, the court also extensively discussed
how the backpay remedy of the WARN Act is analogous to similar
remedies under Title VII and the Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act of 1974' (ERISA), as opposed to the remedies provided
by the FMLA, FLSA, or ADEA.'
This effort to distinguish Title VII and ERISA involved both a
close interpretation of the statutory texts and a loose examination of
legislative intent. First, the Bledsoe district court reasoned that the
WARN Act remedy is substantially narrower than analogous reme-
dies offered under the FMLA, FLSA, or ADEA-insofar as the oth-
er statutes contain alternative damages provisions and are not wholly
79 Bledsoe, 635 F3d at 842 n 7 (noting that its decision was "not altered by plaintiffs' reli-
ance on two cases in which the courts decided to apply a borrowed state-law limitations period
for contract actions to the WARN Act actions at issue").
80 DelCostello v International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 US 151,158 & n 12 (1983).
81 515 US 29 (1995).
82 Bledsoe, 635 F3d at 842 n 7, citing North Star, 515 Us at 35-36 (concluding that any of
the four proposed statutes were suitably analogous as to comply with the rule in DelCostello
but declining to "choose the best of four" since the action in question was timely).
83 See Bledsoe, 258 F Supp 2d at 794-96.
84 Pub L No 93-406, 88 Stat 829, codified as amended at 29 USC § 1001 et seq.
85 In the context of the relevant binding precedent, this was equivalent to an argument
that the WARN Act remedy is equitable in nature. See Lorillard, 434 US at 580, 585 (noting
that the FLSA has been widely held to support a right to trial by jury and holding the same for
the ADEA); Albemarle Paper, 422 US at 415-23 (characterizing the award of backpay under
Title VII as equitable in the context of scrutinizing a judge's refusal to grant the remedy);
Schwartz v Gregori, 45 F3d 1017, 1022-23 (6th Cir 1995) (holding that backpay is available as
an equitable remedy under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA).
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subject to the discretion of the district court judge.' Second, the
court simply reiterated its earlier discussion surrounding the first
prong of the Chauffeurs test. Namely, insofar as a WARN Act plain-
tiff is seeking reimbursement of salary and benefits due rather than
compensation for damages flowing from a wrongful discharge, the
defendant is liable in equity for wrongfully withholding funds in
breach of its fiduciary duty. Third, the court reasoned that Congress
would likely not have intended to extend Seventh Amendment pro-
tection to a WARN Act claimant seeking lost ERISA benefits when
ERISA itself does not provide such protection. 7
In pursuing this final line of reasoning, the district court also ex-
plicitly relied upon persuasive precedent from an unreported 1992
decision in the Eastern District of Missouri, Loehrer v McDonnell
Douglas Corp.' Addressing a WARN Act action for backpay and
ERISA benefits, that court concluded that because ERISA benefits
are equitable in nature, the backpay sought was a monetary remedy
"intertwined with injunctive relief."8 Hence, the Loehrer court relied
on Chauffeurs's intertwined-relief language to conclude that the
WARN Act creates an equitable remedyY This conclusion was fur-
ther bolstered by reference to the fact that WARN Act damage
awards remain entirely within the district court's discretion."
b) Nelson. The newly minted decision in Bledsoe quickly
won converts. In Nelson v Formed Fiber Technologies, LLC,' a mag-
istrate judge sitting in the District of Maine recommended that a mo-
tion to strike jury demand in a WARN Act action be granted, relying
largely on the persuasive precedent of the Sixth Circuit.
In opposing the motion to strike, the aggrieved workers bringing
suit in Nelson retraced the path followed by the plaintiffs in Bentley,
Bledsoe, and Dietrich Industries. First, the Nelson plaintiffs adopted
the argument that had carried the day in Dietrich Industries, arguing
from Second and Eighth Circuit precedent that the WARN Act
remedy is not "backpay" but rather uses daily pay as a measure of
86 See Bledsoe, 258 F Supp 2d at 797.
87 Id at 798. This argument was predicated on the Sixth Circuit's repeated holding that
ERISA claims are equitable in nature. See, for example, Wilkins v Baptist Healthcare System,
Inc, 150 F3d 609, 616 (6th Cir 1998).
88 1992 US Dist LEXIS 22555 (ED Mo).
89 Id at *8, quoting Chauffeurs, 494 US at 571.
90 It is not clear whether the Loehrer court's argument would be undercut by a WARN
Act suit seeking only backpay.
91 Loehrer, 1992 US Dist LEXIS 22555 at *8-10. See also note 64 and accompanying text.
92 2012 WL 118490 (D Me).
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damages. 3 Second, the plaintiffs argued, in the alternative, that the
WARN Act's backpay remedy is legal in nature, parroting the lan-
guage of Bentley for support.4 Finally, the plaintiffs attempted to un-
dermine the Bledsoe court's reliance on judicial discretion over the
WARN Act remedy by noting the contrary decision in FrizzellY
The judge in Nelson focused much of his opinion on dispatching
the reasoning offered in the plaintiffs' motion. Countering the argu-
ment that the WARN Act does not award a backpay remedy, the
judge quickly noted that the Act itself characterizes its remedy as
backpay.' Moreover, he dismissed the relevance of the Second and
Eighth Circuit cases cited by the plaintiffs, insofar as those decisions
"analyze[d] the WARN Act for purposes of borrowing an appropri-
ate state statute of limitations, entailing an entirely different analysis
than that pertaining to whether the WARN Act remedy properly is
characterized as 'equitable' or 'legal.' '97
Next, Nelson rejected the Bentley court's characterization of the
WARN Act, concluding that "the WARN Act remedy is designed to
restore the status quo, a trademark indicium of equitable relief."8
The plaintiff's final argument-regarding the misplaced emphasis on
judicial discretion-was held to be overshadowed by the persuasive
precedent of Bledsoe, as augmented by the supporting language from
Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion in Albemarle Paper." Thus,
relying largely on the precedent set in Bledsoe, the magistrate judge
recommended that a motion to strike jury demand be granted.
As is evident from the preceding discussion, the Seventh
Amendment analysis of the WARN Act is a morass of analogies to
causes of action both ancient and modern. The Sixth Circuit in
Bledsoe articulated what has become an increasingly dominant po-
sition under which the favored analogues support an equitable
93 Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike Jury Demand, Nelson v Formed Fiber
Technologies, LCC, Civil Action No 2:10-00473-GZS, *3-4 (D Me filed Oct 12, 2011) ("Nelson
Opposition"), citing United Paperworkers International Union and Its Local 340 v Specialty
Paperboard, Inc, 999 F2d 51, 55 (2d Cir 1993). See also Aaron v Brown Group, Inc, 80 F3d
1220, 1225 (8th Cir 1996). For an extended reevaluation of these decisions, see Part III.C.
94 Nelson Opposition at *4-5, citing Bentley, 861 F Supp at 67.
95 Nelson Opposition at *6.
96 Nelson, 2012 WL 118490 at *4, quoting 29 USC § 2104(a)(1)(A).
97 Nelson, 2012 WL 118490 at *4.
98 Id at *5.
99 Id at *6, citing Albemarle Paper, 422 US at 443 (Rehnquist concurring). See also notes
63-66 and accompanying text.
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characterization of the Act. The aging Bentley opinion staked out
the opposing position, though in recent years it has sustained heavy
criticism. Going forward, federal courts outside of the Sixth Circuit
are faced with a choice between these standards, with the Seventh
Amendment rights of WARN Act plaintiffs hanging in the balance.
III. TRANSPLANTING BORROWED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
ANALOGIES INTO SEVENTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
Thus far, the Seventh Amendment jurisprudence arising out of
the WARN Act has provided an object lesson in the difficulties of
applying the historical test pronounced in Chauffeurs. As Justice
William Brennan lamented in his concurrence to that decision,
[A]ll too often the first prong of the [ ] test requires courts to
measure modern statutory actions against 18th-century English
actions so remote in form and concept that there is no firm basis
for comparison. In such cases, the result is less the discovery of a
historical analog than the manufacture of a historical fiction."'
True to form, the Bentley and Bledsoe courts tilted at a variety
of analogies. Though both sides of the division of authority claim to
have escaped the equipoise that frustrated the Chauffeurs Court's
first-prong analysis, their conclusions have little persuasive force.
The courts are not to be blamed-even Justice Antonin Scalia has
complained that the historical inquiry demanded by the search for
common law analogues is a "major headache."'M
This Part argues that the courts applying the Seventh Amend-
ment to the WARN Act have failed to give adequate attention to
relevant precedent arising out of the borrowed statute of limitations
context. First, it provides a brief overview of the legal framework
that the Supreme Court has developed to impute statutes of limita-
tions for federal statutes that lack such provisions. Next, it argues
that the analysis demanded by the framework is in fact highly rele-
vant to the resolution of the Chauffeurs test. To support this asser-
tion, it highlights how the Supreme Court has repeatedly used the
statute of limitations analysis to inform its Seventh Amendment de-
cisions-a tendency that has until now been overlooked by both the
courts and the academic literature. This Part then surveys WARN Act
statute of limitations precedent and concludes that this overlooked
100 Chauffeurs, 494 US at 578-79 n 7 (Brennan concurring).
101 City of Monterey v Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd, 526 US 687, 726 (1999) (Scalia
concurring).
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body of law strongly supports a legal characterization of the Act's
remedies.
A. Borrowed Statute of Limitations Analysis
Congress frequently neglects to insert specific statutes of limita-
tions into federal civil laws, leaving courts with the difficult task of
inferring a rule of timeliness from some other source. ' In 1990, Con-
gress stepped in to aid the courts, imposing a default four-year stat-
ute of limitations on federal civil actions as part of the Judicial Im-
provements Act of 1990.' " However, when it enacted this default
limitations period, Congress attempted to restrict its retroactive ap-
plication to existing law, providing that "[e]xcept as otherwise pro-
vided by law, a civil action arising under an Act of Congress enacted
after the date of the enactment of this section may not be commenced
later than 4 years after the cause of action accrues."' Given time, the
courts split over how to apply this anti-retroactivity language to
post-1990 amendments of preexisting law: the Third, Seventh, and
Eighth Circuits determined that the default limitations period ap-
plies only where a plaintiff's cause of action is based solely on a post-
1990 statute that "establishes a new cause of action without refer-
ence to preexisting law";"" the Sixth and Tenth Circuits applied the
default to all post-1990 legislation whether or not it simply amends a
preexisting statute.''  The Supreme Court stepped in to resolve the
split in Jones v R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co," endorsing the Sixth and
Tenth Circuits' more generous application of the four-year limita-
tions period."'
Now that the dust has settled, courts are still faced with the task
of inferring a statute of limitations for certain legislation that, like
the WARN Act, was promulgated before 1990. The "fallback rule
of thumb" for courts confronted with such legislative lacunae is to
"apply the most closely analogous statute of limitations under state
102 See, for example, American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 § 1553, Pub L
No 111-5, 123 Stat 115, 297-302; Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003
§ 4(a)(4)(A), Pub L No 108-193. 117 Stat 2875, 2878, codified as amended at 18 USC § 1595.
103 Pub L No 101-650, 104 Stat 5089, codified at 28 USC § 1658.
104 Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 § 301(a), 104 Stat at 5114-15, codified at 28 USC
§ 1658(a) (emphasis added).
105 Zubi v AT&T Corp, 219 F3d 220. 224-25 (3d Cir 2000); Jones v R.R. Donnelley & Sons
Co, 305 F3d 717, 728 (7th Cir 2002); Madison v IBP, Inc, 257 F3d 780, 798 (8th Cir 2001).
106 See Anthony v BTR Automotive Sealing Systems, Inc, 339 F3d 506, 514 (6th Cir 2003);
Harris v Allstate Ins Co, 300 F3d 1183, 1190 (10th Cir 2002).
107 541 US 369 (2004).
108 Id at 382-83.
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law."' The Supreme Court has also provided a "closely circum-
scribed" exception to this general rule.' In DelCostello v Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters,"' the Court held that it is appropri-
ate to borrow a limitations period from a federal law where such law
"provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and when the
federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that
[statute of limitations] a significantly more appropriate vehicle for
interstitial lawmaking."' 2
Of course, this description of the DelCostello framework is un-
necessarily complex. While the Court has exerted much energy in
weighing whether state- or federal-law analogues should be pre-
ferred, the polarity of that preference is irrelevant to the present in-
quiry. For the purposes of this Comment, it is not the source of the
borrowing that matters but rather the legal or equitable characteriza-
tion of the analogue ultimately selected. As the Supreme Court has
repeatedly demonstrated, DelCostello statute of limitations analysis
is pertinent in the Seventh Amendment context because it requires a
court to search for analogous statutory actions. This crucial method-
ological feature is present whether Congress or a state legislature au-
thored the analogues.
B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence
1. Chauffeurs.
The first pertinent example is the Chauffeurs decision itself,
which directly considered the relevance of dictum from DelCostello
that suggested that an attorney malpractice action is "the closest
state-law analogy for" a claim brought under § 301 of the LMRA for
109 DelCostello v International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 US 151, 158 & n 12 (1983)
(collecting cases). See note 80.
110 Reed v United Transportation Union, 488 US 319, 324 (1989).
111 462 US 151 (1983).
112 Id at 172 (noting that in these instances, the Court will turn away from state law). A
plurality of the Court has also suggested a three-stage inquiry: (1) "whether a uniform statute
of limitations is to be selected," (2) whether such a uniform statute should be derived from a
state or federal source, and (3) whether an analogous federal source affords a "closer fit" with
the cause of action under scrutiny than does any available state law source. Lampf Pleva, Lip-
kind, Prupis & Petigrow v Gilbertson, 501 US 350, 356-57 (1991) (Blackmun) (plurality). This
suggestion has not gained currency in the lower courts, and the Supreme Court itself has con-
tinued to rely on the language in DelCostello. See, for example, North Star, 515 US at 34 (citing
DelCostello for the rule and Lampf merely as an example of its animating policies). Lampf and
DelCostello merely shift the preference for federal versus state analogues-a preference that
has no bearing on the legal or equitable characterization of the analogue ultimately selected.
Thus, for the purposes of this Comment, this doctrinal complexity is ignored as irrelevant, and
DelCostello is regarded as the dominant opinion.
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breach of a duty of fair representation. "3 While the Chauffeurs plu-
rality was ultimately not persuaded by this dictum, it found no fault
in the provenance of the analogy. Rather, it simply voiced skepticism
concerning the failure of the majority in DelCostello to consider an
analogy to actions against trustees for breach of fiduciary duty.'t
Thus, where it could have straightforwardly rejected the relevance of
DelCostello's reasoning to the first prong of its Seventh Amendment
analysis, the Court instead merely attacked the thoroughness of its
prior decision. From the outset, then, the Court left the door open to
transplanting borrowed statute of limitations analogues into the Sev-
enth Amendment inquiry.
2. Wooddell.
In Wooddell, the Court's Seventh Amendment analysis of an
LMRDA action hinged almost entirely on an analogy established in
the borrowed statute of limitations context. After reciting the Chauf-
feurs test, the Court devoted a sentence to explaining that the plain-
tiff's prayer for injunctive relief was incidental to the lost wages
sought, then simply noted that it had "recently held that actions un-
der the LMRDA are closely analogous to personal injury actions,"
citing Reed v United Transportation Union,"5 a borrowed statute of
limitations case. "6 Given the Wooddell Court's heavy reliance on
Reed, it is illustrative to examine how the analogy to a personal inju-
ry action was actually substantiated in the earlier opinion.
The Reed Court considered the proper statute of limitations for
an action brought under § 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA, in which the
plaintiff alleged that the union violated its members' right to free
speech concerning union matters. 7 The Fourth Circuit had inter-
preted DelCostello to require that the statute of limitations be bor-
rowed from the National Labor Relations Act " (NLRA), reasoning
that the plaintiff's claims were so closely linked to "the federal labor
policy favoring stable labor-management relations" as to fall within
the federal law exception to the general rule of DelCostello."
Rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court first noted legisla-
tive history that portrayed § 102(a)(2) as an attempt to enshrine a
113 Chauffeurs, 494 US at 568 (Marshall) (plurality), citing DelCostello, 462 US at 167.
114 Chauffeurs, 494 US at 568 (Marshall) (plurality).
115 488 US 319 (1989).
116 Wooddell, 502 US at 98, citing Reed, 488 US at 326-27.
117 Reed, 488 US at 321.
118 Pub L No 74-198, ch 372, 49 Stat 449 (1935), codified as amended at 29 USC §§ 151-69.
119 Reed v United Transportation Union, 828 F2d 1066, 1070 (4th Cir 1987), revd 488 US
319 (1989).
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"First Amendment value," or "the right to speak one's mind without
fear of reprisal," in the labor context.2 ' On the strength of this char-
acterization, the Court concluded that the claim was "readily analo-
gized for the purpose of borrowing a statute of limitations to state
personal injury actions.' 2. Curiously, the Court declined to flesh out
this analogy, save by noting that it had earlier arrived at a similar
analogy for § 1983 actions.'22 Having thus suggested a suitable state
statute of limitations, the Court considered whether any federal stat-
ute existed that would fall within the federal law exception laid out
in DelCostello.
For this inquiry, the Court was content to focus primarily on the
latter condition of the DelCostello exception-whether the "federal
policies at stake" recommended the adoption of a federal limitations
period. At the outset, the Court confined itself to considering wheth-
er only one statute-the NLRA-was suitably analogous to compel
borrowing its statute of limitations. The NLRA analogy had carried
the day in DelCostello, where the Court sought to infer a limitations
period for a hybrid § 301-fair representation claim brought under
the LMRA. There, the Court first emphasized the absence of any
"close analogy in ordinary state law,""lu then embraced the NLRA
limitations period as more responsive to the federal interests impli-
cated." In particular, the DelCostello majority relied on Justice Pot-
ter Stewart's concurrence in United Parcel Service, Inc v Mitchell,'25
which highlighted that the NLRA's six-month statute of limitations
sought to strike the proper balance between "stable bargaining rela-
tionships," "finality of private settlements," and "an employee's in-
terest in setting aside what he views as an unjust settlement under
the collective-bargaining system.' '26 Insofar as this was the precise
balance of interests implicated by the hybrid § 301-fair representa-
tion claim under consideration, the NLRA limitations period was se-
lected as a suitable analogue.
The Reed Court noted that § 102(a)(2) suits are crucially differ-
ent in several respects from the LMRA action scrutinized in
120 Reed, 488 US at 325, quoting United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v Sad-
lowski, 457 US 102, 111 (1982).
121 Reed, 488 US at 326.
122 See id at 326-27 ("We find it unnecessary to detail here the elements of this analogy."),
citing Owens v Okure, 488 US 235, 249-50 (1989) (holding that § 1983 actions are governed by
state personal injury statutes of limitations).
123 DelCostello, 462 US at 165.
124 Id at 165-69.
125 451 US 56 (1981).
126 DelCostello, 462 US at 171, quoting Mitchell, 451 US at 70-71 (Stewart concurring).
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DelCostello. While the unfair labor practices targeted by § 301 of the
LMRA had negative effects on the "formation and operation of the
collective-bargaining agreement" and "the private settlement of dis-
putes ... through grievance-and-arbitration procedures," § 102(a)(2)
claims involve "union dispute[s] not directly related in any way to
collective bargaining or dispute settlement. '27 Thus, insofar as
§ 102(a)(2) suits do not implicate the balance of federal and private
interests arising out of collective bargaining, the DelCostello Court's
principal rationale for adopting the six-month NLRA statute of limi-
tations was distinguished by the Reed majority. Moreover, the Reed
Court noted, the NLRA limitations period failed to accommodate
"the distinct federal interest in the free speech of union members."'"
In light of this divergence between the federal policies at stake in the
NLRA and LMRA, the Reed Court concluded that the NLRA stat-
ute of limitations was not "'a significantly more appropriate vehicle
for interstitial lawmaking' than the analogous state statute of limita-
tions that [the Court's] established borrowing rule favors.. 2.
Three key features of the Reed majority's analysis should be
noted. First, the Reed opinion devoted almost no attention to sub-
stantiating the analogy to state personal injury actions. Second, the
Court's rejection of the NLRA analogy was justified almost entirely
by the federal interests served by the statutes and their associated
limitations periods. Third, the selection of the state law analogy is
heavily favored by the structure of the DelCostello rule, which con-
siders federal law analogies only under narrow circumstances. How-
ever, despite these weaknesses and biases, the eight-Justice majority
in Wooddell embraced the analogy advanced by the Reed Court as
highly persuasive in the Seventh Amendment context.
3. City of Monterey.
Most recently, in City of Monterey v Del Monte Dunes at Monte-
rey, Ltd,'3° the Court incorporated the fruits of borrowed statute of
limitations analysis into an affirmation of Seventh Amendment
rights. The plaintiff in City of Monterey was seeking compensation un-
der § 1983 for a regulatory taking.'3' While the majority devoted much
of its analysis to attacking an analogy to condemnation proceedings, '32
127 Reed, 488 US at 329-30, citing DelCostello, 462 US at 165, 168.
128 Reed, 488 US at 332-33.
129 Id at 333, quoting DelCostello, 462 US at 172.
130 526 US 687 (1999).
131 Id at 693-94.
132 Id at 711-14.
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it explicitly incorporated a concurrence authored by Justice Scalia in-
to its Chauffeurs analysis.133
That concurrence devoted special attention to the Court's earli-
er discussion in Wilson v Garcia," a borrowed statute of limitations
case Justice Scalia described as being "so precisely [o]n point" as to
give "a distinct quality of djd vu..'3 Wilson was not technically a
DelCostello case. Instead, the Court conducted borrowed statute of
limitations analysis under 42 USC § 1988(a). 36 But the Court inter-
preted that statute as simply requiring "the selection of the most ap-
propriate, or the most analogous state statute of limitations to apply
to [the] § 1983 claim.''. In other words, the statute was interpreted
to provide a test functionally equivalent to the general rule of
DelCostello. The Wilson Court applied the test and determined that
a "tort claim[] for personal injury" was the cause of action most
analogous to § 1983 suits."' Justice Scalia used this conclusion in his
City of Monterey concurrence as support for § 1983's "identity as a
personal-injury tort" in the Seventh Amendment context. '
While he used Wilson as precedent to support his Seventh
Amendment analysis, Justice Scalia also acknowledged that "[i]t is
133 Id at 709 ("Justice Scalia's opinion ... presents a comprehensive and convincing analy-
sis of the historical and constitutional reasons for this conclusion. We agree with his analysis
and conclusion.").
134 471 US 261 (1984), recognized as superseded by statute in Jones, 541 US at 377-81
(documenting how the passage of 28 USC § 1658 superseded Wilson).
135 City of Monterey, 526 US at 725 (Scalia concurring).
136 Section 1988 serves as an alternate gap-filling regime for 42 USC § 1983 and various
other civil rights actions. It provides that, in the event the statutory language creating such
actions is
deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses
against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and stat-
utes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause
is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and dispo-
sition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on
the party found guilty.
42 USC § 1988(a).
137 Wilson, 471 US at 268 (quotation marks omitted). See also Okure, 488 US at 235 (reaf-
firming Wilson and specifying that where a state has both specific and residual limitations peri-
ods for personal injury claims, a § 1983 action should be governed by the residual limitation
period).
138 Wilson, 471 US at 277.
139 City of Monterey, 526 US at 728 (Sealia concurring) ("[In Wilson and Okure, we used
§ 1983's identity as a personal-injury tort to determine the relevant statute of limitations under
... § 1988(a).") (internal cross references omitted). This is not to suggest that Justice Scalia
reasoned only from Wilson and Okure, as the majority had in Wooddell-he also broadly cited
other Supreme Court cases in which § 1983 was characterized as sounding in tort. See id at
727-28 (collecting cases).
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entirely possible to analogize § 1983 to the 'common law' in one
fashion for the purposes of [§ 1988], and in another fashion for pur-
poses of the constitutional guarantee.'"" He noted, however, that
[f]or both purposes [§ 1983] is a "unique federal remedy" whose
character is determined by the federal cause of action, and not
by the innumerable constitutional and statutory violations upon
which that cause of action is dependent. And for both purposes
the search for (often nonexistent) common-law analogues to
remedies for those particular violations is a major headache.' 1
While this discussion was primarily aimed at Justice David Sout-
er's dissenting opinion in City of Monterey-which urged against a
"unified field theory of jury rights under § 1983""'2-the reasoning is
generally applicable to the transplantation of DelCostello analysis in-
to the Seventh Amendment context.
While Justice Scalia's first line of reasoning is ostensibly specific
to § 1983's provision of a "unique federal remedy,"... its thrust is uni-
versal. Though Seventh Amendment and borrowed statute of limita-
tions analyses certainly arise in different legal domains, the remedy
under scrutiny does not inherit new qualities simply because it is be-
ing reconsidered in a new context. Thus, when parties seek to di-
verge from an analogy established in borrowed statute of limitations
precedent, a court weighing Seventh Amendment rights should fol-
low the model of Justice Scalia, who put the burden upon Justice
Souter to "explain why a different approach is appropriate in the
present context.'""
Justice Scalia's second assertion implicates a more pragmatic
concern-it is a waste of judicial resources to conduct a Seventh
Amendment search for historical analogues when there exists rele-
vant borrowed statute of limitations precedent. This problem is fur-
ther aggravated by the difficulty and uncertainty of the historical
test demanded in Chauffeurs, a process that spawns a seemingly
endless string of circuit splits.' While this pragmatic concern cer-
tainly does not free a court from its responsibility to carefully weigh
the application of the Seventh Amendment, it does offer practical
support for the repurposing of DelCostello analyses. At bottom, the
140 Id at 726.
141 Id.
142 Id at 751 (Souter concurring in part and dissenting in part).
143 City of Monterey, 526 US at 726 (Scalia concurring) (addressing the unique nature of
§ 1983 claims).
144 Id.
145 See note 17.
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appeal of this repurposing is quite simple-the products of the bor-
rowed statute of limitations inquiry are highly relevant in the appli-
cation of the historical test established in Chauffeurs.
C. WARN Act Statute of Limitations Precedent
There is significant cross-pollination between borrowed statute
of limitations and Seventh Amendment case law. Can courts use sim-
ilar cross-pollination to determine whether plaintiffs have a jury right
under the WARN Act? The Sixth Circuit in Bledsoe apparently
thought not, giving the relevant precedent a quiet death in a foot-
note.'" The district court in Nelson reached a like conclusion, dis-
regarding several arguments in the plaintiff's brief,"7 on the ground
that North Star "entail[ed] an entirely different analysis" from
Chauffeurs." Given the Supreme Court's repeated reliance on such
borrowed statute of limitations precedent in its own Seventh
Amendment analysis, this tack by both the Bledsoe and Nelson
courts unnecessarily blinkered them to a useful body of persuasive
law from their sister circuits. By ignoring relevant jurisprudence on
the WARN Act, the courts sapped the strength of their ultimate
conclusions and robbed themselves of the opportunity to achieve a
unified interpretation of the statute.
The Bledsoe court's rejection of relevant precedent would have
been less problematic were the neglected body of law not so rich.
However, the question of what limitations period is most appropriate
for WARN Act actions has been weighed by four courts of appeals,'9
146 Bledsoe, 635 F3d at 842 n 7 ("Our determination that the issue to be tried is not analo-
gous to a breach of contract is not altered by plaintiffs' reliance on two cases in which the
courts decided to apply a borrowed state-law limitations period for contract actions to the
WARN Act actions at issue.").
147 See Nelson Opposition at *7-9.
148 Nelson, 2012 WL 118490 at *4. In their brief, the Bledsoe plaintiffs cited several
WARN Act statute of limitations decisions without even noting that they arose outside of the
Seventh Amendment context. The plaintiffs then cited a relevant Supreme Court decision on
the WARN Act limitations period but provided no argument for why the analogy suggested in
that decision was relevant to WARN Act jury rights. See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Bledsoe v Emery Worldwide Airlines, Inc, No 09-4346, *62-63 (6th Cir filed Jan 26, 2010)
(available on Westlaw at 2010 WL 466771). In their reply brief, the plaintiffs once again ne-
glected to substantiate the link between North Star and Chauffeurs analyses, even after being
challenged on this point by the defendants. See Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Bledsoe v
Emery Worldwide Airlines, Inc, No 09-4346 (6th Cir filed Apr 20, 2010) (available on Westlaw
at 2010 WL 7325152).
149 See United Mine Workers of America, AFL-CIO v Peabody Coal Co, 38 F3d 850, 856
(6th Cir 1994) (holding that the WARN Act is most closely analogous to the NLRA), vacd and
remd, 515 US 1119 (1995); Halkias v General Dynamics Corp, 31 F3d 224, 229 (5th Cir 1994)
(holding that the WARN Act and the NLRA have sufficient "similarities in purpose" to permit
borrowing of the § 10(b) limitations period), vacd and remd, 56 F3d 27 (5th Cir 1995) (en banc);
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the Supreme Court,' ° and a smattering of district courts and com-
mentators."' Much of this attention stemmed from an early division
of authority among the circuit courts, with the Fifth and Sixth Cir-
cuits applying the NLRA's statute of limitations. 2 and the Second
and Third Circuits looking to state law. 3 After the Supreme Court
explicitly resolved this split in North Star by rejecting borrowing
from federal law, it still remained for the lower courts to determine
the appropriate state-law limitations periods. Thus, even if one ig-
nores the vacated opinions of the Fifth and Sixth Circuits," ' it is pos-
sible to draw upon the various courts that have identified analogous
state-law limitations periods. In net, each of these sources supports a
characterization of WARN Act actions as actions at law.
1. Supreme Court precedent.
For the purposes of selecting an appropriate WARN Act limita-
tions period, the dominant precedent is, of course, North Star. In that
case, the Supreme Court directly addressed the issue, indicating that
any of several state statutes of limitations were suitably analogous to
United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v Crown Cork & Seal Co, 32 F3d 53, 61 (3d
Cir 1994) (holding that despite the absence of a "perfect analogy" to the WARN Act in state
law, various state-law limitation periods would suffice); United Paperworkers International Un-
ion and Its Local 340 v Specialty Paperboard, Inc, 999 F2d 51, 57 (2d Cir 1993) (holding that a
contract statute of limitations is sufficiently analogous to permit application to WARN Act
actions).
150 See North Star, 515 US at 33-37.
151 See, for example, Jason E. Markel, Note, Divining a Statute of Limitations for the
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification ("WARN") Act: Application of State Statutes of
Limitations versus the NLRA Six-Month Statute of Limitations, 1995 Detroit Coil L Rev 1029,
1053-64 (summarizing the circuit split and analyzing the aftermath of North Star); Peter
J. Mignone, Note, What Statute of Limitations Should Apply to the Worker Adjustment and Re-
training Notification Act?, 63 Fordham L Rev 1419, 1455-58 (1995) (arguing on the eve of
North Star that federal courts should apply the NLRA's six-month statute of limitations to
WARN Act actions).
152 See Peabody Coal, 38 F3d at 856; Halkias, 31 F3d at 229.
153 See Crown Cork, 32 F3d at 61; Specialty Paperboard, 999 F2d at 57.
154 For a general defense of vacated opinions as persuasive precedent, see Charles
A. Sullivan, On Vacation, 43 Houston L Rev 1143, 1187-96 (2006) (arguing that opinions can
retain vitality as persuasive precedent after being vacated on "other grounds"). See also In re
Smith, 964 F2d 636, 638 (7th Cir 1992) (stating that courts of appeals "vacate unappealable de-
cisions, to prevent them from having a preclusive effect," not "to prevent them from having a
precedential effect"); Berkley v United States, 48 Fed C1 361, 370 n 3 (2000) ("Although [a prior
case] was eventually vacated ... and is no longer binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit, it
still provides sound guiding analysis."). While it could be argued that the structure of the
DelCostello test-which permitted the Supreme Court in North Star to overturn the Fifth and
Sixth Circuits without directly undermining the value of the analogy to the NLRA -preserved
the relevance of these vacated opinions, this Comment does not pursue that line of argument.
Given that the relevant reasoning in the vacated opinions largely duplicates that of the un-
scathed opinions, economy dictates the more focused inquiry.
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satisfy DelCostello's directive.'55 In particular, the Court approved of
four possible limitations periods under Pennsylvania law: (1) a two-
year period for enforcing civil penalties generally,"6 (2) a three-year
period for claims under the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collec-
tion Law, "' (3) a four-year period for breach of an implied contract,'
and (4) a six-year residual statute of limitations.59
As the Sixth Circuit recognized in Bledsoe, the North Star Court
declined to identify which state law statute was most analogous, since
the suit at issue would have been timely under even the strictest of
the available options." Still, it is worth noting that, of the four analo-
gous statutes suggested, three are ambiguous as to the law-equity dis-
tinction and one-the implied breach of contract claim-
unequivocally supports a legal characterization of WARN Act actions.
Some might dispute North Star's relevance on the ground that
the bulk of the decision is dedicated to undermining the argument
for an application of the NLRA statute of limitations-an inquiry
that is irrelevant to the Seventh Amendment issue. Even so, some-
thing can be gleaned from the curious phrasing that the majority
adopted in its central holding: "Since, then, a state counterpart pro-
vides a limitations period without frustrating consequences, it is
simply beside the point that even a perfectly good federal analogue
exists..'. While the final clause is dictum, to be sure, its language un-
dercuts contrary suggestions that the WARN Act is most analogous
to ERISA or Title VII by implicitly endorsing the NRLA as an ade-
quate federal analogue.
2. Second Circuit precedent.
Turning to the lower courts, the Second Circuit, in United Pa-
perworkers International Union and Its Local 340 v Specialty Paper-
board, Inc,'62 was the first court of appeals to consider the issue. The
court first rejected the NLRA analogy because of the divergent fed-
eral policies animating the two statutes, reasoning that the WARN
Act is targeted not at collective bargaining but rather at "allevi-
at[ing] the distress associated with job loss for both the workers and
155 See North Star, 515 US at 35.
156 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 5524(5) (Purdon 1981), held unconstitutional by Common-
wealth v Neiman, 5 A3d 353 (Pa Super Ct 2010).
157 43 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 260.9a(g) (Purdon 1992).
158 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 5525(4) (Purdon 1981).
159 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 5527 (Purdon 1981).
160 See Bledsoe, 635 F3d at 842 n 7.
161 North Star, 515 US at 37.
162 999 F2d 51 (2d Cir 1993).
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the community in which they live.' 6' Next, the court attacked any po-
tential analogy to the FLSA. In this discussion, the court used lan-
guage that is relevant to the Seventh Amendment inquiry (as was
recognized by the plaintiffs in Nelson'"): "Although damages are
measured as two months['] pay and benefits, the WARN claim is not
a claim for backpay because it does not compensate for past ser-
vices.... [V]ictims of a failure to warn will often be unaware that
they have suffered a compensable harm.' '6. This rejection of the
characterization of WARN Act actions as "backpay" is directly at
odds with the Bledsoe district court's Title VII and ERISA analogies.
Furthermore, the description of the WARN Act remedy as "damages"
belies the "restitutionary" label assigned to it by the Sixth Circuit.
Satisfied that the WARN Act falls within DelCostello's general
"rule of thumb,"'" the Second Circuit proceeded to consider the
proper state-law limitations period. Although the court was unable
to settle upon any "perfectly analogous" state statute, it quickly de-
termined that the Vermont statute of limitations for contract claims
was the best available analogy.' To support this conclusion, the
court noted that Vermont courts applied the same statute of limita-
tions in the workers' compensation context, which involves actions
that are also aimed at protecting workers from "unexpected jobless-
ness..... Thus, though the Second Circuit was careful to disclaim the
notion that WARN Act actions should be treated identically to con-
tract actions, its holding closely aligns such claims with a prototypical
action at law: the breach of contract suit for damages. 9
3. Third Circuit precedent.
The Third Circuit followed the Second Circuit's rejection of fed-
eral law analogies. In United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-
CLC v Crown Cork & Seal Co'7-a case ultimately affirmed by the
Supreme Court in North Star-the court similarly noted that the
WARN Act and the NLRA serve purposes that are too distinct to
163 Id at 54.
164 See text accompanying notes 92-97.
165 United Paperworkers, 999 F2d at 55.
166 DelCostello, 462 US at 158 n 12. See also text accompanying note 105.
167 United Paperworkers, 999 F2d at 57.
168 Id, citing Hartman v Ouellette Plumbing & Heating Corp, 507 A2d 952, 953 (Vt 1985)
and Fitch v Parks & Woolson Machine Co, 191 A 920, 922 (Vt 1937).
169 See United Paperworkers, 999 F2d at 57 ("We must emphasize, however, that this de-
termination does not mean that WARN is a contract action and that it should be found to be
an implied term in every employment contract.").
170 32 F3d 53 (3d Cir 1994).
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invoke the exception to DelCostello's default rule.7 ' Indeed, aside
from a brief detour to distinguish circuit precedent, 2 the Crown
Cork opinion very closely followed the path forged by the Second
Circuit. Though the court described the WARN Act in a footnote as
providing "a strict statutory mechanism for computing damages,"'73
little else of relevance can be gleaned from this discussion. Insofar as
North Star considered an appeal from Crown Cork, the four Penn-
sylvania statutes of limitations that the Supreme Court affirmed are
identical to those considered by the Third Circuit. Thus, the Crown
Cork court's blanket approval of the various analogous statutes does
not offer any independent, persuasive precedent.
4. Post-North Star precedent: Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits.
Three circuit courts have considered the appropriate WARN
Act limitations period in the years following North Star. In Frymire v
Ampex Corp,74 the Tenth Circuit adopted a state-law contract limita-
tions period, holding that "the WARN Act imposes a federal man-
date upon employers that effectively obligates them as if bound by
the terms of an employment contract. 7... The Eighth Circuit followed
suit in Aaron v Brown Group, Inc,'76 where it embraced a similar in-
terpretation of the WARN Act as notionally "insert[ing] additional
terms into covered employment contracts.. 77 In rejecting a contrary
analogy to the limitations period from Missouri's wage-and-hour
statute, the Eighth Circuit also expressly followed the Second Circuit
in asserting that the WARN Act remedy is not "a claim for backpay
because it does not compensate for past services.' 7. Finally, in the
most recent decision, the Fifth Circuit sanctioned the borrowing of ei-
ther a two-year tort limitations period or a four-year contract-claims
171 Id at 59 ("In order to justify departing from the general rule, the analogy must be more
direct.").
172 See id, citing Haggerty v USAir, Inc, 952 F2d 781, 787 (3d Cir 1992).
173 Crown Cork, 32 F3d at 59 n 2.
174 61 F3d 757 (10th Cir 1995).
175 Id at 764 ("Additionally, the WARN remedy of back pay mirrors the type of remedy
afforded those who fall victim to an implied contract breach-giving individuals what they
would have been entitled to had there been no breach.").
176 80 F3d 1220 (8th Cir 1996).
177 Id at 1225 (holding that Missouri's five-year statute of limitations for contract actions
should govern WARN Act actions).
178 Id, citing United Paperworkers, 999 F2d at 55.
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and actions-in-debt limitations period. 7 ' Though the court noted that
a WARN Act suit is "not particularly analogous to either," it none-
theless highlighted comparable features aligning the various ac-
tions." ' Thus, each circuit court to address the WARN Act statute of
limitations after North Star has analogized it to a state action at law.
D. Applying Borrowed Statute of Limitations Precedent to the
Seventh Amendment Question
While the case law surrounding the WARN Act statute of limi-
tations is not readily susceptible to pithy summary, several generali-
zations can be made. As explained in Part III.C, the Second, Third,
Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have all explicitly embraced an
analogy between the WARN Act and an action at law in the context
of a DelCostello analysis. While the Supreme Court in North Star did
not explicitly endorse such an analogy, it did sanction an assortment
of analogues-three ambiguous statutes and one which was un-
equivocally "legal.".... Two courts-the Fifth and Sixth Circuits-
rejected state law in favor of an analogy to the NLRA, but each has
since been vacated in light of North Star's contrary holding.
Thus, the consensus of the federal circuits appears to favor an
analogy between WARN Act actions and either breach of contract
or tort actions at law. In light of the Supreme Court's past reliance
on even the sparest of borrowed statute of limitations precedent,"'
this existing consensus thus militates strongly for the characterization
of the WARN Act action and its attendant remedy as legal in nature.
This conclusion is further supported by the reasoning employed
by the circuit courts in pursuing their borrowed statute of limitations
analyses. The Second and Eighth Circuits have each described the
WARN Act backpay remedy as "not a claim for backpay," an asser-
tion that directly undercuts any attempt to link the remedy to the
backpay awards that are equitable in the Title VII and ERISA con-
texts.'3 In addition, several circuit courts have suggested that the
WARN Act's effect is equivalent to the insertion of additional lan-
guage into employment contracts, an assertion that directly contradicts
179 Staudt v Glastron, Inc, 92 F3d 312, 316 (5th Cir 1996) (declining to determine which of
the two potentially analogous statutes of limitations was applicable because plaintiff's claim
was timely under both).
t50 Id (stating that the WARN Act is like a tort claim in that "both require a 'wrongful'
act by the defendant" and that it is like an action on a debt for wages in that "[tihe worker can
recover what he would have earned had his employer provided him the requisite notice").
181 North Star, 515 US at 36.
182 See Part III.B.
183 United Paperworkers. 999 F2d at 55; Aaron, 80 F3d at 1225.
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the Bledsoe district court's analysis of the first prong of the Chauf-
feurs test. Thus, the extant borrowed statute of limitations precedent
has even more persuasive value in the Seventh Amendment context
than did the Reed analogy that carried the day in Wooddell.
IV. CLARIFYING THE INTERACTION BETWEEN DELCOSTELLO AND
CHA UFFEURS ANALYSES
While the Supreme Court has repeatedly used analogues from
its DelCostello jurisprudence to inform Seventh Amendment inquir-
ies, the Court has never provided an explicit justification for this
cross-pollination. Thus far, this Comment has contented itself with
merely highlighting the Court's past practices, with the goal of rebut-
ting the claim that borrowed limitations period analogues are irrele-
vant to the Chauffeurs analysis. This Part takes the next step, explor-
ing why analogues advanced in DelCostello analyses are germane to
the Seventh Amendment context. In particular, this Part addresses
two obvious problems with exporting analogues from the DelCostel-
lo analysis.
The first difficulty arises out of the fundamental mismatch be-
tween the analogues considered in borrowed statute of limitations
analyses and those considered in a Seventh Amendment inquiry.
While DelCostello's default rule demands that courts "apply the
most closely analogous statute of limitations under state law, '' "8
Chauffeurs requires a comparison first of "statutory action[s]" and
then of "remed[ies] sought."'' Thus, the product of a DelCostello
analysis is an analogous statute of limitations, while the product of a
Chauffeurs analysis is an analogous civil action and remedy. Viewed
from this perspective, it is hard to fault the Sixth Circuit for finding
that DelCostello entails an entirely different analysis from Chauffeurs.
Following on the heels of this observation is an obvious ques-
tion: Which of the two prongs of the Chauffeurs inquiry does a
DelCostello analysis speak to? When the Wooddell Court relied on
the statute of limitations analogy produced in Reed, was it resolving
the first-prong search for an eighteenth-century analogue or the se-
cond-prong inquiry into the proper characterization of the statutory
remedy? If statute of limitations precedent can inform the Seventh
Amendment inquiry, one must determine where exactly it enters in-
to the two-pronged test that structures that inquiry.
184 DelCostello, 462 US at 158.
185 Chauffeurs, 494 US at 565 (Marshall) (plurality), quoting Tull v United States, 481 US
412, 417-18 (1987).
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This Part tackles each of these difficulties in turn. First, it ad-
dresses the mismatch between the analogues produced by DelCostel-
lo and Chauffeurs analyses, concluding that this superficial incongru-
ity actually poses no barrier to cross-pollination. Next, it explores
how statute of limitations precedent can be used to inform both the
first and the second prong of the Chauffeurs analysis.
A. Untangling the Link between Statutes of Limitations, Civil
Actions, and Remedies
This Section grapples with an irrebuttable truth: statutes of limi-
tations are not civil actions, and neither is a remedy. If courts applied
the DelCostello test simply by casting about for analogous statutes of
limitations, this truism would entirely undermine the transplantation
of the DelCostello analysis into the Chauffeurs test. However, a brief
reconsideration of the case law surveyed in the previous Part makes
evident that courts seldom (if ever) confine themselves to a direct
consideration of statutes of limitations. Rather, courts frequently ap-
proach the DelCostello analysis by analyzing the substantive rights
protected by the civil action under scrutiny, characterizing its reme-
dies, and only afterward anointing an analogous statute.
Considering first the WARN Act precedent generated by the
circuit courts, the Second Circuit opinion in United Paperworkers
provides an excellent example of this phenomenon. When the Se-
cond Circuit rejected an analogy to the FLSA statute of limitations,
it concerned itself not with limitations periods per se but rather with
a characterization of the WARN Act's backpay remedy as monetary
"damages" pegged to worker salaries.'" When the same court even-
tually settled on an analogy to a state-law, contract-claim limitations
period, it justified its holding by noting that the same statute was
used by state courts to regulate workers' compensation suits."' The
critical link in this argument was that both workers' compensation
actions and WARN Act actions implicate workers' substantive rights
to protection from "unexpected joblessness.""
Turning to the relevant Supreme Court precedent, this narrative
becomes more complicated. As discussed in Part III.B.2, the Reed
decision-relied upon by the Wooddell Court-pursued a course of
reasoning somewhat orthogonal to the Seventh Amendment ques-
tion.'9 In addition, the DelCostello opinion cited in Chauffeurs also
186 United Paperworkers, 999 F2d at 55.
187 Id at 57.
188 Id. See also Part III.B.2.
189 Reed, 488 US at 326-31.
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focused primarily on timing issues specific to the limitations period." '
However, the Wilson decision integrated by Justice Scalia into his
City of Monterey concurrence is much more consistent with the prac-
tice of focusing on remedies sought and substantive rights protected.9'
In fact, Wilson provides a particularly striking example of how
the search for an analogous statute of limitations bleeds into a search
for an analogous cause of action. The Wilson majority began its in-
quiry by straightforwardly announcing an intention to "adopt[] the
statute governing an analogous cause of action under state law."'" In
order to arrive at a suitable analogy, the Court resolved itself to de-
veloping a "characterization of § 1983 for statute of limitations pur-
poses," which was said to be "derived from the elements of the cause
of action, and Congress' purpose in providing it."'' The ensuing
analysis reflected this methodology, considering analogies to tort and
malpractice by comparing the remedies sought and the rights pro-
tected by those civil actions.
Though Wilson provides strong confirmation of the narrative
pursued in this Part, it does little to explain why the Wooddell major-
ity and Chauffeurs plurality sought support from limitations period
analogies with justifications orthogonal to the Seventh Amendment
inquiry. One possible answer is that the Court was simply motivated
by a desire to harmonize its Seventh Amendment and borrowed
statute of limitations jurisprudence. 5 Another possibility is that the
Court actually had in mind independent justifications for the analo-
gies in the jury trial context but simply found it unnecessary to ex-
press them. At bottom, though, the Justices simply provided too little
discussion to definitively resolve this puzzle. Thus, while much of the
interaction between the DelCostello and Chauffeurs analyses can be
clarified, this particular corner of the law remains a black box. For
these two decisions, it must suffice to conclude that the Court found
a borrowed limitations period analogy persuasive in the Seventh
Amendment context, though one knows not why.
190 DelCostello, 462 US at 164-72.
191 See City of Monterey, 526 US at 724-29 (Scalia concurring), citing Wilson 471 US at
268-77.
192 Wilson, 471 US at 271.
193 Id at 268.
194 Id at 272-79.
195 This motivation tracks Justice Scalia's discussion in his concurrence to City of Monte-
rey. Unless there exists a compelling reason to sustain divergent -and perhaps contradictory-
characterizations of the same statutory language, a court should strive to adopt a unified analy-
sis. See City of Monterey, 526 US at 723-26 (Scalia concurring).
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B. Locating the Interface between DelCostello and Chauffeurs
Analyses
In the previous Section, this Comment examined the somewhat
vague relationship between the analogies adopted in the Seventh
Amendment context and those adopted in the borrowed statute of
limitations context. While that discussion partly resolved how statute
of limitations analogies can be used to inform a Seventh Amendment
inquiry, it remains to be shown exactly where these analogues can be
plugged into the two-prong Chauffeurs test. This Section addresses
that question, first by considering the Supreme Court's decisions in
Chauffeurs, Wooddell, and City of Monterey, and then by noting that
the reasoning borne of borrowed limitations period analysis can
fruitfully be brought to bear on both prongs of the prevailing Sev-
enth Amendment analysis.
This Comment has documented three decisions in which the Su-
preme Court used analogues developed in a DelCostello analysis to
resolve a Seventh Amendment question. Each of these decisions in-
corporated borrowed statutes of limitations into its first-prong analy-
sis, using DelCostello precedent to aid in the search for an "18th-
century action[] brought in the courts of England prior to the merger
of the courts of law and equity."" Thus, to the extent that the Su-
preme Court has provided guidance on this question for the lower
courts, it has indicated that borrowed statute of limitations analysis
should be used to inform the first prong of the Chauffeurs historical
test.
The discussion in the previous Section, however, supports a
much broader application of statute of limitations reasoning. Insofar
as courts seeking to impute a limitations period frequently scrutinize
the statutory remedies and the parties' substantive rights, DelCostel-
lo precedent is obviously relevant to the second-prong characteriza-
tion of the remedy sought. Where courts pursuing a DelCostello
analysis assess the suitability of analogies by reference to the reme-
dies sought, the legal or equitable characterization of the analogy se-
lected has obvious bearing in the Seventh Amendment context. The
WARN Act precedent surveyed in Part III offers fertile ground for
the application of this approach.
196 Chauffeurs, 494 US at 565 (Marshall) (plurality), quoting Tull, 481 US at 417. See also
City of Monterey, 526 US at 709; Wooddell, 502 US at 98.
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CONCLUSION
Seventh Amendment analyses of novel statutes are inevitably
complicated by the impracticality of drawing analogies between the
legal forms of the eighteenth and twenty-first centuries. This Com-
ment has illustrated that the abstruse inquiries demanded by Chauf-
feurs and its progeny need not, and should not, be considered in a
vacuum. Rather, courts should ground their Seventh Amendment
reasoning within a broader construction of the statutes they examine.
In the case of the WARN Act, this entails a careful consideration of
persuasive precedent arising out of the borrowed statute of limita-
tions analysis. As this Comment has argued, this source of persuasive
precedent supports an interpretation under which WARN Act ac-
tions are analogous to actions at law. However, the general frame-
work-under which a court confronted with a Seventh Amendment
question attempts to situate its holding within the broader body of
law-has a wider application.
Indeed, Congress's frequent failure to supply specific statutes of
limitations renders the DelCostello analysis a common occurrence,
despite the legislative effort to provide a default federal limitations
period. It is thus no happenstance that the Supreme Court has
dipped into this rich source of law on several occasions. As this
Comment demonstrates, much can be gained from attempting to in-
tegrate the modern jurisprudence surrounding a statute into the his-
torical test.
Moreover, there is a sound pragmatic basis for this approach.
When the various circuit courts of appeals interpreted the WARN
Act in the borrowed limitations period context, they committed
themselves to specific characterizations of civil actions brought un-
der the Act. Insofar as these characterizations, and the analogies that
they foster, carry over into the Seventh Amendment context, they
should constrain the courts' reasoning under the Chauffeurs test.
Given the link that the Supreme Court has recognized between ana-
logues developed in these two areas of law, it is counterintuitive and
counterproductive for the courts to adopt different characterizations
of the Act (and its remedies) in the two contexts. Under this analysis,
the courts should follow the sage advice of Justice Scalia and refrain
from fracturing their conception of the WARN Act unless they can
"explain why a different approach is appropriate" in the Seventh
Amendment context1 T
197 City of Monterey, 526 US at 726 (Scalia concurring).
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